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TARGET RULES FOR PUBLIC CHOICE ECONOMIES ON
TREE NETWORKS AND IN EUCLIDEAN SPACES  
ABSTRACT. We consider the problem of choosing the location of a public facil-
ity either (a) on a tree network or (b) in a Euclidean space. (a) (1996) characterize
the class of target rules on a tree network by Pareto efﬁciency and population-
monotonicity. Using Vohra’s (1999) characterization of rules that satisfy Pareto
efﬁciency and replacement-domination, we give a short proof of the previous
characterization and show that it also holds on the domain of symmetric pref-
erences. (b) The result obtained for model (a) proves to be crucial for the ana-
lysis of the problem of choosing the location of a public facility in a Euclidean
space. Our main result is the characterization of the class of coordinatewise tar-
get rules by unanimity, strategy-proofness, and either replacement-dominationor
population-monotonicity.
KEY WORDS: Single-peakedpreferences,Tree networks,Euclideanspaces, Tar-
get rules, Pareto efﬁciency, Population-monotonicity,Replacement-domination
1. INTRODUCTION
First, we consider the problem of choosing the location of a pub-
lic facility on a tree network, or tree,1 when agents have single-
peaked preferences. For the special case where the tree equals a
closed interval, the problem coincides with the problem of choosing
a level of a public good when agents have single-peaked prefer-
ences (Moulin, 1980).2 An example for the problems we consider
is the problem of locating a public facility, e.g., a library, on a tree
network that represents an infrastructure (the network of roads of
a neighborhood). Several solutions for this class of problems have
been proposed and characterized by desirable properties; see for
instance Ching and Thomson (1996), Danilov (1994), Foster and
Vohra (1998), Schummer and Vohra (2001), and Vohra (1999).
  A previous version of this paper was presented at the International Confer-
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Forrules ontreenetworks,Ching andThomson(1996)andVohra
(1999) consider the solidarity properties population-monotonicity
andreplacement-domination,respectively.Replacement-domination
states that if an agent’s preference relation is ‘replaced’ by some
other admissible preference relation, then this unilateral change af-
fects the remaining agents in the same direction, i.e., the remain-
ing agents all (weakly) gain or they all (weakly) lose. Population-
monotonicity requires that after the arrival of new agents all agents
initially present are affected in the same direction. It turns out that
the class of rules satisfying Pareto efﬁciency and population-mono-
tonicity is the class of ‘target rules’ (Ching and Thomson, 1996).3
Each target rule is determined by its target point. If the target point
is Pareto efﬁcient, then the target point is chosen by the rule. If the
target point is not Pareto efﬁcient, then the closest Pareto efﬁcient
point to the target point is chosen by the rule. This target oriented
decision pattern is implicitly present in many decision processes in
our daily lives and in many public choice decision processes, target
oriented decisions prevail, particularly when the target point equals
a status quo point.
Vohra (1999) proves for tree networks that if the set of agents
is ﬁxed, contains at least three agents, and has symmetric single-
peaked preferences, then the class of rules satisfying Pareto efﬁ-
ciency and replacement-domination equals the class of target rules.
Weshowthat thisresult remains truefor thelarger domainofsingle-
peaked preferences. In the ﬁrst part of the paper, using Vohra’s
(1999) result and our result that Pareto efﬁciency and population-
monotonicity imply replacement-domination, we give a short proof
of Ching and Thomson’s (1996) characterization. Furthermore, we
prove that the characterization also holds on the smaller domain of
symmetric single-peaked preferences. This latter result turns out to
be crucial for the second part of the paper.
In the second part of the paper, we analyze the implications of
the solidarity properties population-monotonicity and replacement-
domination for the problem of choosing the location of a public
facility in a Euclidean space or allocating several public issues, e.g.,
budget-constrained investment divisions among several public pro-
jects or bundles of public goods. We assume that every agent has
an individual best point and his preferences decline according to theTARGET RULES FOR PUBLIC CHOICE ECONOMIES 15
distance to this best point. Because agents might weigh coordinates
differently, we assume that preferences are induced by separable-
quadratic distance functions (Border and Jordan, 1983). Other pa-
pers that study solutions to the problem of choosing the location of
apublicfacilityinaEuclideanspaceandtheirpropertiesareBarberà
et al. (1993), Peremans et al. (1997), and Peters et al. (1992).
If we naturally extend target rules to Euclidean spaces, it is ob-
vious that none of these rules satisﬁes either one of the solidarity
properties. However the coordinatewise versions of the target rules,
which are not Pareto efﬁcient, do satisfy replacement-domination,
population-monotonicity, and the weaker efﬁciency requirement of
unanimity. It follows from a result of Border and Jordan (1983) and
the previous results for rules on trees (or particularly the real line)
that, essentially, the class of coordinatewise target rules is char-
acterized by unanimity, strategy-proofness, and either population-
monotonicity or replacement-domination.
2. PUBLIC GOOD ECONOMIES ON TREE NETWORKS
2.1. The model
As in Ching and Thomson (1996) and Vohra (1999) we consider the
problem of choosing a location on a tree T. Since for our analysis
it only matters that for any two locations on T there exists a unique
path that connects these two locations, we omit a formal deﬁnition
of a tree; see for instance Demange (1982). Let x,y ∈ T. Then, by
[x,y] we denote the path connecting x and y. Note that according
to this notation, [x,y]=[ y,x].
There is a population of ‘potential’ agents, indexed by P ⊆ N
where N denotes the set of natural numbers. We assume that P con-
tains at least three agents, i.e., |P|  3. Note that P can be either
ﬁnite or inﬁnite. Each agent i ∈ P is equipped with a continuous
and ‘single-peaked’ preference relation Ri deﬁned on T (Demange,
1982). As usual, xR i y is interpreted as ‘x is weakly preferred to y’,
and xP i y as ‘x is strictly preferred to y’. Single-peakedness of Ri
means that Ri is single-peaked on every path of T; i.e., there exists
a point p(Ri) ∈ T, called the peak of agent i, with the following
property: for allx,y ∈ T, x  = y, such that [y,p(Ri)]⊂[ x,p(Ri)],
we have yP i x.B yR we denote the class of all continuous, single-16 BETTINA KLAUS
peaked preference relations on T.B yP we denote the class of
non-empty and ﬁnite subsets of P.F o rN ∈ P, RN denotes the
set of (preference) proﬁles R = (Ri)i∈N such that for all i ∈ N,
Ri ∈ R.Arule ϕ is a function that assigns to every N ∈ P and
every R ∈ RN a location ϕ(R) ∈ T, i.e., ϕ:
 
N∈P RN → T.
2.2. Target rules and their properties
The ﬁrst property of a rule we introduce is Pareto efﬁciency.L e t
N ∈ P and x,y ∈ T.I ff o ra l li ∈ N, xR i y and for some j ∈ N,
xP j y, then we call x a Pareto improvement of y.
Pareto efﬁciency: For all N ∈ P and all R ∈ RN, there exists
no Pareto improvement of ϕ(R).
Let N ∈ P and R ∈ RN. Then, by P(R)we denote the convex
hull of all agents’ peaks; i.e., the smallest connected subset of the
tree that contains all agents’ peaks.
Consider the ‘degenerate’ case where T equals an interval or the
real line. Then, P(R)=[ mini∈N p(Ri),maxi∈N p(Ri)] and Pareto
efﬁciency is equivalent to ϕ(R) ∈ P(R). It is easy to show that this
condition also characterizes Pareto efﬁciency of rules on trees. We
call P(R)the Pareto set of R.
LEMMA 1. Ar u l eϕ is Pareto efﬁcient if and only if for all N ∈ P
and all R ∈ RN, ϕ(R) ∈ P(R).
The following class of ‘target rules’ will play an important role
in the sequel. Any target rule is determined by its target point. If the
target point is Pareto efﬁcient, then it is chosen by the rule. If the
target point is not Pareto efﬁcient, then the (unique) closest Pareto
efﬁcient point to it is chosen by the rule.
Target rules: Let a ∈ T.4 Then, by ϕa we denote the following





a if a ∈ P(R),
x where x ∈ P(R)is the closest point to P(R)
otherwise.
Next, we introduce the ‘solidarity’ property replacement-domi-
nation. It incorporates a notion of solidarity among agents when aTARGET RULES FOR PUBLIC CHOICE ECONOMIES 17
single agent changes his preference relation, e.g., if an agent’s pref-
erence relation is exchanged by another preference relation, then,
after this change, either all remaining agents are (weakly) better off
ortheyallare(weakly)worseoff.In arecent paper,Thomson(1999)
surveys the literature on replacement-domination.
Let N,M ∈ P with N ⊆ M and R ∈ RM. We denote the
restriction(Ri)i∈N ∈ RN of R toN byRN.Wealsousethenotation
R−i = RN\{i}. For example, ( ¯ Ri,R −i) denotes the proﬁle obtained
from R by replacing Ri by ¯ Ri.
Replacement-domination: For all N ∈ P,a l lR ∈ RN,a l lj ∈
N,andall ¯ Rj ∈ R,either[foralli ∈ N\{j},ϕ(R)Ri ϕ( ¯ Rj,R −j)]
or [for all i ∈ N\{j}, ϕ( ¯ Rj,R −j)R i ϕ(R)].
Thomson (1993) proved that if T is a closed interval and the set
of agents is ﬁxed and contains at least three agents, then the class of
rulessatisfyingParetoefﬁciencyandreplacement-dominationequals
the class of target rules. For tree networks T, Vohra (1999) proves
the characterization for the subdomain of symmetric preferences
S ⊂ R. We state his result for the variable population setting at
hand.




SN → T.T h e nϕ sat-
isﬁes Pareto efﬁciency and replacement-domination if and only if
for every N ∈ P, |N|  3, there exists aN ∈ T such that for all
R ∈ SN, ϕ(R) = ϕaN
(R).
It is easy to show that the characterization of Theorem 1 also









RN → T.T h e nϕ satis-
ﬁes Pareto efﬁciency and replacement-domination if and only if for
every N ∈ P, |N|  3, there exists aN ∈ T such that for all
R ∈ RN, ϕ(R) = ϕaN
(R).
Proof. It is easy to prove that if for every N ∈ P, |N|  3, there
exists aN ∈ T such that for all R ∈ RN, ϕ(R) = ϕaN
(R),t h e nϕ
satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency and replacement-domination.
Let ϕ satisfy Pareto efﬁciency and replacement-domination.L e t
N ∈ P and |N|  3. Then, by Theorem 1, there exists aN ∈ T such18 BETTINA KLAUS
that for all R ∈ SN, ϕ(R) = ϕaN
(R).W eh a v et op r o v et h a tf o ra l l
¯ R ∈ RN, ϕ( ¯ R) = ϕaN
( ¯ R).
Let ¯ R ∈ RN.I f ¯ R ∈ SN,t h e nϕ( ¯ R) = ϕaN
( ¯ R) and we are done.
If ¯ R/ ∈ SN, then there exists some j ∈ N such that ¯ Rj / ∈ S.N e x t ,
we replace agent j’s preference relation by a symmetric preference
relation with the original peak: let ˜ R be such that ˜ R−j = ¯ R−j,
p( ˜ Rj) = p( ¯ Rj),a n d ˜ Rj ∈ S. Hence, at proﬁle ˜ R we increased
the number of agents with symmetric preferences by one. By Pareto
efﬁciency and replacement-domination, ϕ( ˜ R) = ϕ( ¯ R). Hence, if
˜ R ∈ SN,t h e nϕ( ˜ R) = ϕaN
( ˜ R) = ϕaN
( ¯ R). Thus, ϕ( ¯ R) = ϕaN
( ¯ R).
If ˜ R/ ∈ SN, then there exists some k ∈ N such that ˜ Rk / ∈ S. Simil-
arly as before, we can increase the numberof agents with symmetric
preferences by one, etc. Since the number of agents in N is ﬁnite,
this procedure ends with a symmetric preference proﬁle ˆ R ∈ SN
such that for all i ∈ N, p( ˆ Ri) = p( ¯ Ri) and ϕ( ˆ R) = ...= ϕ( ˜ R) =
ϕ( ¯ R) = ϕaN
( ¯ R). 
The next solidarity property we discuss is population-mono-
tonicity. It incorporates a notion of solidarity among agents when
changesinthepopulationoccur, e.g.,ifagroupofagentsleave,then,
after this change, either all remaining agents are (weakly) better
off or they all are (weakly) worse off. For a survey on population-
monotonicity we refer to Thomson (1995).
Population-monotonicity: For all N,M ∈ P such that N ⊆ M
and all R ∈ RM, either [for all i ∈ N, ϕ(RN)R i ϕ(R)] or [for all
i ∈ N, ϕ(R)Ri ϕ(RN)].
The following lemma will be useful later on. We leave the simple
proof to the reader.
LEMMA 2. Let ϕ satisfy Pareto efﬁciency and population-mono-
tonicity. Then, for all N,M ∈ P such that N ⊆ M,a l li ∈ N, and
all R ∈ RM, ϕ(RN)R i ϕ(R).F u r t h e r m o r e ,i fϕ(R) ∈ P(R N),t h e n
ϕ(RN) = ϕ(R). Particularly, if P(R N) = P(R),t h e nϕ(RN) =
ϕ(R).
Ching and Thomson (1996) proved that on the domain of single-
peaked preferences the class of rules satisfying Pareto efﬁciency andTARGET RULES FOR PUBLIC CHOICE ECONOMIES 19
population-monotonicity equals the class of target rules. We state
this result for the domain of symmetric preferences.
THEOREM 2. Suppose ϕ :
 
N∈P SN → T.T h e nϕ satisﬁes
Pareto efﬁciency and population-monotonicityif and only if ϕ = ϕa
for some a ∈ T.
The proof of Theorem 2 can be found in the Appendix. On one
hand, the proof establishes the validity of Ching and Thomson’s
(1996) result on the domain of symmetric preferences, on the other
hand, it is an alternative way to prove Ching and Thomson’s (1996)
characterization. Furthermore, Theorem 2 proves to be crucial for
the analysis of the problem of choosing the location of a public
facility in a Euclidean space in Section 3.
Next, we discuss the incentive property strategy-proofness for
rules on tree networks. Strategy-proofness requires that no agent
ever beneﬁts from misrepresenting his preference relation.
Strategy-proofness: For all N ∈ P,a l lR ∈ RN,a l lj ∈ N,a n d
all ¯ Rj ∈ R, ϕ(R)Rj ϕ( ¯ Rj,R −j).
It is easy to prove that any target rule is strategy-proof.S i n c e
the names of the agents do not matter in the assignment of the loc-
ation, these rules also satisfy the well-known property anonymity.
Hence, the class of rules that satisfy Pareto efﬁciency and either
replacement-domination or population-monotonicity are selections
of the set of rules satisfying Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-proofness,
and anonymity. In his seminal paper, Moulin (1980) characterized
thelatterclassofrules forthecase thatT isalineoraclosed interval
as the class of ‘generalized Condorcet-winner rules’ or ‘generalized
median-voter rule’: the outcome is the median of the peaks of the
|N| agents and |N|−1 ﬁxed ballots.5 In the case of a target rule, all
|N| − 1 ﬁxed ballots are equal to the target point.
The last property for rules we consider is unanimity: If all agents
have the same preference relation, then the unanimous best point for
all, the common peak, is chosen by the rule.
Unanimity: For all N ∈ P and all R ∈ RN such that for all
i,j ∈ N, Ri = Rj, ϕ(R) = p(Ri).
It is easy to prove that unanimity and strategy-proofness together
imply Pareto efﬁciency. Hence, in Moulin’s (1980) characterization20 BETTINA KLAUS
ofgeneralizedmedian-voterrules,Paretoefﬁciencycanbeweakened
to unanimity (Ching, 1997).6 This also implies that in Theorems 1
and 2, we can replace Pareto efﬁciency by unanimity and strategy-
proofness.




SN → T.T h e nϕ satisﬁes
unanimity, strategy-proofness, and replacement-domination if and
only if for every N ∈ P, |N|  3, there exists aN ∈ T such that for
all R ∈ SN, ϕ(R) = ϕaN
(R).
COROLLARY 3. Suppose ϕ :
 
N∈P SN → T.T h e nϕ satisﬁes
unanimity, strategy-proofness, and population-monotonicity if and
only if ϕ = ϕa for some a ∈ T.
Note that Corollaries 2 and 3 remain true on the larger domain
of single-peaked preferences. The properties in Corollaries 2 and
3 are independent: Any constant rule satisﬁes strategy-proofness,
replacement-domination,a n dpopulation-monotonicity, but not un-
animity. Any dictatorial rule satisﬁes unanimity and strategy-proof-
ness, but neither replacement-domination nor population-monoton-
icity. The following rule ψa satisﬁes unanimity, population-mono-
tonicity,a n dreplacement-domination, but not strategy-proofness.
Furthermore it is not Pareto efﬁcient.
EXAMPLE 1. Let a ∈ T. Then, for all N ∈ P and all R ∈ RN,
ψa(R) =
 
p(Ri) if for all i,j ∈ N, Ri = Rj,
a otherwise.
3. PUBLIC GOOD ECONOMIES IN EUCLIDEAN SPACES
3.1. The model
As Border and Jordan (1983) we consider the problem of choosing
a location in some Euclidean space E. We assume that E = Rm
where m ∈ N.
There is a population of ‘potential’ agents, indexed by P ⊆ N.
We assume that P contains at least three agents, i.e., |P|  3. NoteTARGET RULES FOR PUBLIC CHOICE ECONOMIES 21
that P can be either ﬁnite or inﬁnite. Each agent i ∈ P is equipped
with a separable-quadratic preference relation Ri over E (Border
and Jordan, 1983); that is: for each agent i ∈ N there exists a strictly
positive weight vector δi = (δi
1,...,δi
m)   0a n dapeak p(Ri) ∈













j)2 = 1,andp(Ri) ∈ E.ByQwedenotetheclassofallseparable-
quadratic preference relations on E. For each agent i ∈ P,w e
identify the preference relation Ri ∈ Q with its characteristic pair
(δi,p(R i)) and write Ri = (δi,p(R i)) ∈ Q.
Single-peakedness of preference relations Ri on E means that
Ri is single-peaked on every line in E that contains p(Ri).I ti s
easy to check that all separable-quadratic preference relations are
single-peaked, i.e., for all Ri ∈ Q,a l lx ∈ E, x  = p(Ri),a n da l l
λ ∈ (0,1), p(Ri)P i [λp(Ri) + (1 − λ)x]Pi x. A geometric implic-
ation of Ri ∈ Q being separable-quadratic is that the corresponding
indifference sets are ellipsoids around the peak p(Ri) with main
diagonals parallel to the coordinate axes. The closer these ellipsoids
are to p(Ri) the better the points on it are.
For N ∈ P, QN denotes the set of (preference) proﬁles R =
(Ri)i∈N such that for all i ∈ N, Ri ∈ Q.Arule ϕ is a function that
assigns to every N ∈ P and every R ∈ QN a location ϕ(R) ∈ E;
i.e., ϕ:
 
N∈P QN → E.
3.2. Coordinatewise target rules and their properties
We are interested in the same properties as for rules on tree net-
works.ThedeﬁnitionsofParetoefﬁciency,replacement-domination,
population-monotonicity, strategy-proofness,a n dunanimity are ob-
tained from the previous deﬁnitions by simply replacing the domain
of each agent’s preferences R by Q.
Similarly as before, a target rule is deﬁned as follows. For any
given target point in E and any preference proﬁle the following
holds. If the target point is Pareto efﬁcient, then the target point
is chosen by the rule. If the target is not Pareto efﬁcient, then the
(unique) closest Pareto efﬁcient point to the target point is chosen
by the rule.22 BETTINA KLAUS
However, because now, agents report with their preference re-
lation a separable-quadratic distance function, it is easy to show
that none of the target rules satisﬁes strategy-proofness.7 Further-
more, none of the target rules satisﬁes replacement-domination or
population-monotonicity.
Therefore weconsiderthefollowingvariationsoftarget rules:the
coordinatewise target rules. We need some extra notation.
Let j ∈{ 1,...,m}, i ∈ P and Ri ∈ Q. Then, by R
j
i ,w ed e -
note the restriction, or projection, of the preference relation to the
jth coordinate axes. Note that then R
j
i is a symmetric preference
relation deﬁned on R where R represents the jth coordinate axes.
For N ∈ P and R ∈ QN, Rj = (R
j
i )i∈N denotes the restriction of
proﬁle R to the jth coordinate axes. Let ¯ E ≡ (R ∪{ − ∞ ,∞})m.
Coordinatewise target rules: Let a = (a1,...,a m) ∈ ¯ E. Then,
by ϕa we denote the following coordinatewise target rule with
targetpoint a:forallN ∈ P,a llR ∈ QN,andallj ∈{ 1,...,m},
ϕa
j(R) = ϕaj(Rj).
It is easy to prove that none of the coordinatewise target rules
satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency. However, any coordinatewise target rule
satisﬁes unanimity, anonymity, strategy-proofness, replacement-
domination,a n dpopulation-monotonicity. Hence, the class of co-
ordinatewise target rules is a selection of the set of rules satisfy-
ing unanimity, anonymity,a n dstrategy-proofness. Recall that in the
one-dimensional case, this latter class is equal to the class of gener-
alized median-voter rules.
Border and Jordan (1983) showed that a rule that satisﬁes un-
animity and strategy-proofness can be decomposed into coordinate-
wise rules that are again unanimous and strategy-proof.
For N ∈ P and j ∈{ 1,...,m}, the set of restricted preference





THEOREM 3 (Border and Jordan). Let N ∈ P.Ar u l eϕ : QN →
E satisﬁes unanimity and strategy-proofness if and only if there are
m (coordinatewise) rules ϕj : QN
j → R, j ∈{ 1,...,m}, which are
unanimous and strategy-proof such that for all N ∈ P,a l lR ∈ QN,
and all j ∈{ 1,...,m}, ϕj(R) = ϕj(Rj).TARGET RULES FOR PUBLIC CHOICE ECONOMIES 23
Hence, by Theorem 3, the class of rules that satisfy unanimity
strategy-proofness,a n danonymity, similarly as for the one-dimen-
sional case (Moulin, 1980), consists of generalized median-voter
rules: the outcome is the coordinatewise median of the peaks of
the |N| agents and |N| − 1 ﬁxed ballots. Again, in the case of a
coordinatewise target rule, all |N| − 1 ﬁxed ballots are equal to the
target point a ∈ E.
3.3. Two characterizations
Since none of the target rules satisﬁes replacement-domination or
population-monotonicity,i ti so b v i o u st h a tT h e o r e m s1a n d2d o
not extend to rules on the set of separable-quadratic proﬁles. The
following theorems demonstrate that Corollaries 2 and 3 do extend
to the model at hand.




QN → E.T h e nϕ satisﬁes
unanimity, strategy-proofness, and replacement-domination if and
only if for every N ∈ P, |N|  3, there exists aN ∈ E such that for
all R ∈ QN, ϕ(R) = ϕaN
(R).
Proof. Let N ∈ P and |N|  3 and assume that ϕ satisﬁes
unanimity, strategy-proofness,a n dreplacement-domination. Then,
by Theorem 3, there exist m (coordinatewise) rules ϕj : QN
j → R,
j ∈{ 1,...,m}, which are unanimous and strategy-proof, such that
for all R ∈ QN,a n da l lj ∈{ 1,...,m}, ϕj(R) = ϕj(Rj).
Since all rules ϕj satisfy unanimity and strategy-proofness,t h e y
also satisfy Pareto efﬁciency (with respect to dimension j). Further-
more, it is easy to see that replacement-domination of the rule ϕ
implies replacement-domination (with respect to dimension j)f o r
the rules ϕj.8 Since any of the rules ϕj satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency
andreplacement-domination,byTheorem1,9 forallj ∈{ 1,...,m}
there exist aN
j ∈ R such that for all Rj ∈ QN
j , ϕj(Rj) = ϕ
aN
j (Rj).
Let aN ≡ (aN
1 ,...,aN
m). Then, for all R ∈ QN, ϕ(R) = ϕaN
(R). 
THEOREM 5. Suppose ϕ :
 
N∈P QN → E.T h e nϕ satisﬁes
unanimity, strategy-proofness, and population-monotonicity if and
only if ϕ = ϕa for some a ∈ E.
Proof.Letϕ satisfyunanimity,strategy-proofness,andpopulation-




j → R, j ∈{ 1,...,m}, which are unanimous
and strategy-proof, such that for all N ∈ P,a l lR ∈ QN,a n da l l
j ∈{ 1,...,m}, ϕj(R) = ϕj(Rj).
Since all rules ϕj satisfy unanimity and strategy-proofness,t h e y
also satisfy Pareto efﬁciency (with respect to dimension j). Fur-
thermore, it is easy to see that population-monotonicity of the rule
ϕ implies population-monotonicity (with respect to dimension j)
for the rules ϕj.10 Since any of the rules ϕj satisﬁes Pareto efﬁ-
ciency and population-monotonicity, by Theorem 2,11 for all j ∈
{1,...,m} thereexist aj ∈ R such that for all N ∈ P,a l lRj ∈ QN
j ,
ϕj(Rj) = ϕaj(Rj).L e ta ≡ (a1,...,a m). Then, ϕ = ϕa. 
The rules that prove the independence of the properties in Corol-
laries 2 and 3 can be easily adjusted to demonstrate the independ-
ence of the properties in Theorems 4 and 5.
As one of the referees pointed out: ‘Theorems 4 and 5 can be
viewed as answers to the followingquestions: Which (sequences of)
generalized median voter schemes satisfy population-monotonicity
(or replacement-domination)?’
4. CONCLUSION
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) prove that in many situations in-
dividuals disproportionally stick to the status quo. In other words,
a ‘target bias’ with the target equal to the status quo is present in
manydecisions.Ourmain resultsimplythat in publicgood econom-
ies Pareto efﬁciency and solidarity imply such a target bias. Target
rules with the target equal to the status quo are useful in economic
situations when agents have veto power over changes in the status
quo. A practical advantage of target rules is that they are simple
and can be implemented easily and quickly. Furthermore, they are
strategy-proof and to some extent fair if they use ‘fair’ target points.
Similar results for probabilistic rules are obtained in Ehlers and
Klaus (2001).TARGET RULES FOR PUBLIC CHOICE ECONOMIES 25
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 2
First we show that Pareto efﬁciency and population-monotonicity
imply replacement-domination.
LEMMA 3. Letϕ :
 
N∈P SN → T beParetoefﬁcientandpopula-
tion-monotonic. Then ϕ satisﬁes replacement-domination.
Proof. Let ϕ be a Pareto efﬁcient and population-monotonic rule.
Hence, we can apply Lemma 2 throughout the proof. Assume, by
contradiction, that ϕ does not satisfy replacement-domination.T he n
there exist N ∈ P, j,k,l ∈ N, j  = k,l,a n dR, ¯ R ∈ SN such that
R−j = ¯ R−j and
ϕ(R)Pk ϕ( ¯ R) and ϕ( ¯ R)Pl ϕ(R).( 1 )
Lemma 2 applied to R and R−j implies for all i ∈ N\{j},
ϕ(R−j)R i ϕ(R).( 2 )
Lemma 2 applied to ¯ R and R−j = ¯ R−j implies for all i ∈ N\{j},
ϕ(R−j)R i ϕ( ¯ R).( 3 )
By(1)and(2), ϕ( ¯ R−j)P k ϕ( ¯ R).Hence, by(3)andParetoefﬁciency,
ϕ( ¯ R) / ∈ P(¯ R−j).B y( 1 )a n d( 3 ) ,ϕ(R−j)P l ϕ(R). Hence, by (2) and
Pareto efﬁciency, ϕ(R) / ∈ P(R −j).
Assume that agent l leaves proﬁle ¯ R. Because ϕ( ¯ R) / ∈ P(¯ R−j) it
followsthat ϕ( ¯ R) ∈[ p( ¯ Rj),p( ¯ Rk)]⊆P(¯ R−l). Thus,by Lemma 2,
ϕ( ¯ R−l) = ϕ( ¯ R). Next, we add agent l with preference relation ˜ Rl
suchthatp( ˜ Rl) = ϕ( ¯ R)toproﬁle ¯ R−l.SinceP(¯ R−l) = P(¯ R−l, ˜ Rl),
by Lemma 2, ϕ( ¯ R−l, ˜ Rl) = ϕ( ¯ R−l) = ϕ( ¯ R).
Now, agent j leaves proﬁle ( ¯ R−l, ˜ Rl).S i n c eϕ( ¯ R−l, ˜ Rl) ∈
P(¯ R−j,l, ˜ Rl), by Lemma 2, ϕ( ¯ R−j,l, ˜ Rl) = ϕ( ¯ R−l, ˜ Rl) = ϕ( ¯ R).
Then, weadd agent j withpreference relation ˜ Rj such that p( ˜ Rj) =
ϕ(R)toproﬁle( ¯ R−j,l, ˜ Rl).Recall thatϕ(R)Pk ϕ( ¯ R)=ϕ( ¯ R−j,l, ˜ Rl).
Hence, if ϕ( ¯ R−j,l, ˜ Rj, ˜ Rl)/ ∈ P(¯ R−j,l, ˜ Rl),t h e nϕ( ¯ R−j,l, ˜ Rj, ˜ Rl) ∈
[ϕ(R),p( ¯ Rk)].T h i si m p l i e st h a tϕ( ¯ R−j,l, ˜ Rj, ˜ Rl)P k ϕ( ¯ R−j,l, ˜ Rl).
ThisisacontradictiontoLemma2.So,ϕ( ¯ R−j,l, ˜ Rj, ˜ Rl) ∈ P(¯ R−j,l,
˜ Rl) a n db yL e m m a2 ,ϕ( ¯ R−j,l, ˜ Rj, ˜ Rl) = ϕ( ¯ R−j,l, ˜ Rl) = ϕ( ¯ R).26 BETTINA KLAUS
Next, agent k leaves proﬁle ( ¯ R−j,l, ˜ Rj, ˜ Rl).S i n c eϕ( ¯ R−j,l, ˜ Rj,
˜ Rl) ∈ P(¯ R−j,k,l, ˜ Rj, ˜ Rl), by Lemma 2,
ϕ( ¯ R−j,k,l, ˜ Rj, ˜ Rl) = ϕ( ¯ R−j,l, ˜ Rj, ˜ Rl) = ϕ( ¯ R). (4)
Next, assume that agent k leaves proﬁle R. Because ϕ(R) / ∈
P(R −j) it follows that ϕ(R) ∈[ p(Rj),p(Rl)]⊆P(R −k). Thus,
by Lemma 2, ϕ(R−k) = ϕ(R). Next, we add agent k with pref-
erence relation ˆ Rk such that p( ˆ Rk) = ϕ(R) to proﬁle R−k.S i n c e
P(R −k) = P(R −k, ˆ Rk), by Lemma 2, ϕ(R−k, ˆ Rk) = ϕ(R−k) =
ϕ(R).
Now,agentj leaves(R−k, ˆ Rk).Sinceϕ(R−k, ˆ Rk)∈P(R −j,k, ˆ Rk),
by Lemma 2, ϕ(R−j,k, ˆ Rk) = ϕ(R−k, ˆ Rk) = ϕ(R). Then, we add
agent j with preference relation ˜ Rj to proﬁle (R−j,k, ˆ Rk).S i n c e
P(R −j,k, ˆ Rk) = P(R −k, ˜ Rj, ˆ Rk), by Lemma 2, ϕ(R−k, ˜ Rj, ˆ Rk) =
ϕ(R−j,k, ˆ Rk) = ϕ(R).
Next, agent k leaves proﬁle (R−k, ˜ Rj, ˆ Rk).S i n c eϕ(R−k, ˜ Rj,
ˆ Rk) ∈ P(R −k, ˜ Rj),byLemma2,ϕ(R−j,k, ˜ Rj) = ϕ(R−k, ˜ Rj, ˆ Rk) =
ϕ(R). Then, we add agent k with preference relation ˜ Rk such that
p( ˜ Rk) = ϕ( ¯ R) to proﬁle (R−j,k, ˜ Rj). Recall that ϕ( ¯ R)Pl ϕ(R) =
ϕ(R−j,k, ˜ Rj). Therefore, if ϕ(R−j,k, ˜ Rj, ˜ Rk)/ ∈ P(R −j,l, ˜ Rj),t h e n
ϕ(R−j,k, ˜ Rj, ˜ Rk) ∈[ ϕ( ¯ R),p(Rl)]. Thus, ϕ(R−j,k, ˜ Rj, ˜ Rk)P l
ϕ(R−j,k, ˜ Rj). This would be in contradiction to Lemma 2. So,
ϕ(R−j,k, ˜ Rj, ˜ Rk) ∈ P(R −j,l, ˜ Rj).Then,byLemma2,ϕ(R−j,k, ˜ Rj,
˜ Rk) = ϕ(R−j,l, ˜ Rj) = ϕ(R).
Next, agent l leaves proﬁle (R−j,k, ˜ Rj, ˜ Rk).S i n c eϕ(R−j,k, ˜ Rj,
˜ Rk) ∈ P(R −j,k,l, ˜ Rj, ˜ Rk),byLemma2itfollowsthatϕ(R−j,k,l, ˜ Rj,
˜ Rk) = ϕ(R−j,k, ˜ Rj, ˜ Rk) = ϕ(R). Then, we add agent l with pref-
erence relation ˜ Rl to (R−j,k,l, ˜ Rj, ˜ Rk).S i n c eP(R −j,k,l, ˜ Rj, ˜ Rk) =
P(R −j,k,l, ˜ Rj, ˜ Rk, ˜ Rl), by Lemma 2, ϕ(R−j,k,l, ˜ Rj, ˜ Rk, ˜ Rl) =
ϕ(R−j,k,l, ˜ Rj, ˜ Rk) = ϕ(R).
Next, agent k leaves (R−j,k,l, ˜ Rj, ˜ Rk, ˜ Rl).S i n c eϕ(R−j,k,l, ˜ Rj,
˜ Rk, ˜ Rl) ∈ P(R −j,k,l, ˜ Rj, ˜ Rl) = p( ˜ Rl), by Lemma 2,
ϕ(R−j,k,l, ˜ Rj, ˜ Rl) = ϕ(R−j,k,l, ˜ Rj, ˜ Rk, ˜ Rl) = ϕ(R). (5)TARGET RULES FOR PUBLIC CHOICE ECONOMIES 27
Since ¯ R−j,k,l = R−j,k,l and ϕ(R)  = ϕ( ¯ R), (4) and (5) constitute a
contradiction. 
Note that Lemma 3 remains true on the larger domain of single-
peaked preferences.
Applying Lemma 3 and Theorem 1, we providea simpleproof of
Theorem 2. Note that this proof remains valid on the larger domain
of single-peaked preferences.
Proof of Theorem 2. It is easy to prove that all target rules satisfy
Pareto efﬁciency and population-monotonicity.
Let|P|  3andlettheruleϕ satisfyParetoefﬁciencyandpopula-
tion-monotonicity.ByLemma3,ϕ satisﬁesreplacement-domination.
Hence, by Theorem 1, for each N ∈ P such that |N|  3, there
exists aN such that for all R ∈ SN, ϕ(R) = ϕaN
(R).
First, we show that for all N,M ∈ P such that |N|,|M|  3,
aN = aM ≡ a.L e tx,y ∈ T and consider R1 ∈ SN, R2 ∈ SM,
and R3 ∈ SN∪M such that R3
N = R1, R3
M = R2,a n dP(R1) =
P(R2) = P(R3) =[ x,y].
Suppose M\N  =∅ . Adding all agents j ∈ M\N with R3
j
yields proﬁle R3.S i n c eP(R1) = P(R3), by Lemma 2, ϕaN
(R1) =
ϕaN∪M
(R3).S inc ex,y ∈ T were arbitrarilychosen and bythedeﬁn-
ition of ϕaN
and ϕaN∪M
, aN = aN∪M. Similarly, we can conclude
that aM = aN∪M. Hence, aN = aM ≡ a.
By Pareto efﬁciency,f o ra l lN ∈ P such that |N| = 1a n da l l
R ∈ SN, ϕ(R) = ϕa(R). Hence, it remains to be shown that for all
N ∈ P such that |N| = 2a n da l lR ∈ SN, ϕ(R) = ϕa(R).
Let N ∈ P be such that |N| = 2a n dR ∈ SN.L e tj ∈ N,
k ∈ P\N, Rk = Rj, and consider (R,Rk) ∈ SN∪{k}.S i n c eP(R)=
P(R,R k), by Lemma 2, ϕ(R) = ϕ(R,Rk).S i n c e|N ∪{ k}| = 3,
ϕ(R,Rk) = ϕa(R,Rk) = ϕa(R). Hence, ϕ(R) = ϕa(R). 
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NOTES
1. A tree is a connected graph that contains no cycles.
2. Preferences on an interval are single-peaked if up to a certain point, the peak
level, preferences are strictly increasing, and strictly decreasing beyond that
point.Onatree,preferencesaresingle-peakedifpreferencesaresingle-peaked
on all paths of the tree.
3. Target rules are sometimes called status quo rules or status quo solutions.
4. Note that if T = R,t h e n a ∈ R ∪{ − ∞ ,∞}.
5. On tree networks, Schummer and Vohra (2001) characterize the class of
strategy-proof and onto rules. Any such rule equals an ‘extended general-
ized median voter rule’ that coincides with a generalized median voter rule
on any path of the tree.
6. Note that Moulin (1980) and Ching (1997) analyze the case where the tree
is a closed interval or the real line. However, the proof that for rules on tree
networks unanimityand strategy-proofnesstogether imply Pareto efﬁciency is
similar to the case where the tree is a closed interval or the real line.
7. For certain preference proﬁles, an agent, by lying over his distance function,
can deform the Pareto set of the proﬁle in such a way that the target rule
assigns a point that he prefers to the outcome when he is honest.
8. To see this, note that we can construct ϕj from ϕ as follows. Let Rj ∈ QN
j
and deﬁne R ∈ QN such that for all k  = j and all i ∈ N, p(Rk
i ) = 0.
Then, ϕj(Rj) ≡ ϕj(R). Hence, if ϕ satisﬁes replacement-domination,t h e n
ϕj satisﬁes replacement-domination.
9. Here, it is important that Theorem 1 is valid on the domain of symmetric,
single-peaked preferences.
10. Similarly as in the proof of Theorem 4, we can construct ϕj from ϕ and
show that if ϕ satisﬁes population-monotonicity,thenϕj satisﬁes population-
monotonicity.
11. Again, it is important that Theorem 2 is valid on the domain of symmetric,
single-peaked preferences.
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